Read about Rooker-Feldman Doctrine as it relates to ICWA. www.caicw.org/Rooker-Feldman.html

[1] The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). In simple terms, “[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine only three times, in the named cases and, just this year, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., where it emphasized
the narrow scope of the doctrine:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not
otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court activities. 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005). (5) Our earlier precedent is consistent. As we explained in Noel v. Hall, [a] federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.

Mary Doe first tries to sidestep Rooker-Feldman on the theory that state court jurisdiction under § 1911 (a) was not raised and litigated in Lake County Superior Court, thus preventing Mary Doe’s federal complaint from being characterized as a de facto appeal. Rather than ask the federal district court to reconsider the substance of the state court orders to terminate Mary Doe’s parental rights and approve the adoption of Jane, Mary Doe contends the complaint presents a new jurisdictional issue. We are not persuaded.

[2] Although the ICWA jurisdictional issue was not raised in the state court proceedings, Mary Doe’s federal claim is still a de facto appeal of a state court judgment, and the jurisdictional issue raised by Mary Doe is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158.

Indeed, while not explicitly addressed in the state court’s rulings terminating Mary Doe’s parental rights and approving Jane’s adoption, the state court necessarily must have concluded it had jurisdiction pursuant to ICWA and Public Law 280 to make those decisions. (6) Thus, the fact that Mary Doe now challenges the state court’s jurisdiction under ICWA does not change our initial Rooker-Feldman calculus. Mary Doe requests that we “undo” a prior state court judgment, which is another way of presenting a federal district court with a de facto appeal that bars subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 (“Stated plainly, ‘Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims.’ ”) (citations omitted).

Our conclusion that Mary Doe’s case falls within the traditional boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is but one piece of the jurisdictional puzzle. We next consider whether
Congress, in enacting ICWA, provided federal courts authority to invalidate state court actions in the narrow area of child custody proceedings involving Indian children. If so, Rooker- Feldman would not preclude federal jurisdiction. Before turning to ICWA, we consider other circumstances in which Congress authorized federal courts to review state court judgments.

[3] The Constitution does not command the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Rooker-Feldman is not a constitutional doctrine. Rather, the doctrine arises out of a pair of negative inferences drawn from two statutes. . . . .”). As a result, Congress may authorize federal district courts to review state court judgments. Id. at 1079 (Rooker-Feldman must be considered in the context of “the entire federal jurisdictional constellation,” including congressional grants of authority to review state-court decisions in certain cases). Federal statutes that permit federal courts to review state court judgments are rare but obvious. (7) Two examples, habeas corpus and bank-ruptcy jurisdiction, are often referred to as “exceptions” to Rooker-Feldman.

As we explained in Noel, the principle that there should be no appellate review of state court judgments by federal trial courts has two particularly notable statutory exceptions:

First, a federal district court has original jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus brought by state prisoners who claim that the state court has made an error of federal law.

Second, a federal bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction under which it is empowered to avoid state judgments, to modify them, and to discharge them. 341 F.3d at 1155 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In both instances, the statutes reflect clear congressional grants of authority. Another useful example of an explicit grant of authority for federal courts to invalidate state court judgments is the implementing legislation of the Hague Convention. The statute, the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), provides that state and federal courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague Convention. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).

We have interpreted this provision of ICARA to provide federal district courts the authority to vacate state custodial decrees that violate the Hague Convention:

In this case, Congress has expressly granted the federal courts jurisdiction to vindicate rights arising under the Convention. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a). Thus, federal courts must have the power to vacate state custody determinations and other state court orders that contravene the treaty. Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1085 n.55 (9th Cir. 2001).

[4] Whether characterized as exceptions to Rooker- Feldman or as specific grants of authority, these three examples underscore that Congress may by statute grant federal
courts authority to review certain state court judgments.

(5) We note that the Court-Appellees did not raise preclusion principles on appeal, and the Department of Social Services raised preclusion principles in only one sentence of its brief. As a result, we leave for another case the relationship between § 1914 and the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
341 F.3d at 1158.

(6) Rooker-Feldman applies where the plaintiff in federal court claims that the state court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rooker- Feldman bars subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claim challenging determinations of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board and California state courts that they had jurisdiction over Olson Farms under the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1987) (Rooker-Feldman bars subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claim that Alaska Superior Court wrongly found it had personal jurisdiction over plaintiff); Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman bars subject-matter jurisdiction over federal claim that state court lacked personal jurisdiction).

(7) Courts have been loath to recognize statutory authorizations to review state court judgments. See, e.g., Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the Americans With Disabilities Act “does not provide an independent source of federal court jurisdiction that overrides the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” even though the ADA subjects state public entities to the terms of the act); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753, 755 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Rooker-Feldman to bar § 1983 suit claiming state foreclosure proceeding was a deprivation of property without due process, but noting that Rooker-Feldman “simply forbids federal district court appellate review of state court judgments in the guise of collateral attacks when no federal statute authorizes such review’ ” (quoting James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 2008 n.46 (1992)); Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1080 (D. Kan. 1995), aff’d, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6598 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The only exception to . . . the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is where a federal statute authorizes federal appellate review of final state court decisions.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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Rooker-Feldman Doctrine