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Florida: Court rejects Seminoles' effort to raise > boy > > > Breaking new ground for Florida courts in cases involving the > welfare of American Indian children, an appeals court ruled > Wednesday that the ''best interests'' of a seriously ill > half-Seminole child outweigh the Seminoles' desire to raise him > within the tribe's culture and traditions. > > The Fourth District Court of Appeal in West Palm Beach ruled > that > the 4-year-old boy, identified only as K.D., must remain with a > non-Indian family that has cared for him since birth in a medical > foster home. The eight-page decision affirmed a 2006 ruling by > Broward Circuit Judge Hope Bristol. > > The ruling allows Bristol to set aside provisions of the Indian > Child Welfare Act, a federal law that gives American Indians great > preference over non-Indians when deciding who should raise a Native > American child taken into custody by state child-welfare > administrators. > > In K.D.'s case judges had to weigh two competing interests: the > state's desire to protect a child whose medical needs are so great > that child-protection workers said he needs to live with a family > specially trained and equipped to care for him, versus the > Seminoles' desire -- and right -- to raise him as a member of their > tribe. > > The Seminole Tribe of Florida, which has a reservation in > Hollywood, > was saddened by the ruling and will consider appealing it to the > Florida Supreme Court, said the tribe's attorney, Donald A. Orlovsky > of West Palm Beach. Read More... > > Source: www.miamiherald.com ( | Youth )
Indian Takers
A war for custody of 4-year-old Raven Laws includes a spurious Alabama tribe
Published: March 22, 2007
Steve Bison of Alabama's Cherokee River Indian Community says the war over 4-year-old Raven Laws may be traced back to the legendary Battle of Horseshoe Bend.
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David Hollenbach
Superior Court Judge Lisa Daniel Flores ruled in favor of Raven’s mother.
"It's a long story," he says.
Fought during the War of 1812, it pitted soldiers under the leadership of General Andrew Jackson and their Cherokee Indian allies against the Creeks. After his victory, Jackson forced the Creeks to cede about half of Alabama and part of Georgia. The Cherokees claimed a chunk of that land, for a time.
The connection between a cute little Apache Junction girl and the seventh president of the United States does require a certain leap of logic, or illogic.
But the issues aren't nearly so obscure to most everyone else involved in one of Maricopa County's more unusual custody battles.
To Superior Court Judge Lisa Daniel Flores, it would come down to this:
Yes, Raven's mother, Rochelle Walters, had a record of committing crimes and abusing methamphetamine. Police had arrested Walters on forgery and identity theft charges while she was pregnant with Raven, and returned her to jail from a Valley hospital bed soon after she gave birth.
Raven's father, Marty Laws, also a convicted felon and a tweaker, couldn't take care of himself, much less a small child.
And, yes, the judge would conclude, Jack and Aneta Bessinger, a Cave Creek couple who had assumed surrogate parenting duties of Raven, had done a fine job (and without financial compensation).
The Bessingers operate Embrace, a home for at-risk children in the desert north of Phoenix. Raven had lived there since shortly after her birth, except for eight months that ended in April 2005, when Shelly Walters was jailed on a probation violation for continuing to do meth and a shoplifting conviction.
But to the Bessingers' dismay, Flores ruled last November 14 that Walters, apparently drug-free for almost a year by then, had earned a shot at being a real mother to Raven, who was two weeks short of her fourth birthday.
Earlier, the judge had given everyone a good idea of where she was headed.
"I don't question the good motivation that you have to help people and trying to help Ms. Walters," Flores told the Bessingers in June 2006, six months after the couple won temporary legal custody of Raven.
"But you need to understand that she is Mom, and she is going to get the child back as soon as her life is together . . . If Ms. Walters does have her act together — and Child Protective Services clearly thinks she does — there is absolutely no basis for her to be with you."
In other words, natural parents legally hold sway in custody cases, even over folks who may have done a better job with a child than the biological parents.
In this instance, the Bessingers had bonded with Raven as if she were their own.
"No one paid a dime to these people, including the mom," says their attorney, Greg Riebesehl. "As a society, we should feel blessed to have people out there like them. It's very sad what happened."
Trouble was, according to the ample public records produced during this case, the Bessingers took desperate measures to ensure that Raven never again would live under her mother's roof.
Those measures began a few months after Walters was released from prison in early 2004, when the couple filed court documents accusing her of abandoning Raven. That first legal attempt to convince a judge that Walters' parental rights should be terminated didn't work.
But the Bessingers remained steadfast, often with good reason, that they could better provide for Raven than her mother.
They upped the ante in late 2005, alleging that Walters had sexually abused Raven during a Christmas Day visit. However, a forensic examiner at ChildHelp failed to substantiate the claims.
Unfortunately, allegations (true or not) of abuse are commonplace in Family Court and rarely become newsworthy. The Raven Laws custody battle would have stayed out of the media but for a bizarre turn of events in late January.
It hit the news on January 23, after two Native American women, somehow connected with Alabama's Cherokee River Indian Community (CRIC), kidnapped Raven from her mother's home in Apache Junction.
The women took Raven while Shelly Walters was in a Mesa courtroom trying to persuade Judge Flores to end visitation privileges approved for the Bessingers after the couple grudgingly had returned the child in November.
Accompanied by a Maricopa County sheriff's deputy, the women flashed papers at Walters' 14-year-old daughter, who was home alone with her half-sister Raven.
Signed by an alleged "juvenile judge pro tem" with the Cherokee River Indian Community, the paperwork said the group was assuming control over Raven's case under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act.
Enacted in 1978, that law allows tribes to assume control over certain custody matters involving Native American kids. Congress created the Act after alarmingly high numbers of Indian children were taken from their families and placed into non-tribal foster and adoptive homes, where they often lost touch with their cultural heritage.
The law covers only children who belong to any of the 562 tribes officially recognized by the U.S. government, or those eligible for membership in one of those tribes.
Raven Laws is about 5 percent Indian, according to genetic testing that the Bessingers commissioned last year (at a cost of about $7,000, according to court records).
But the Cherokee River Indian Community isn't a recognized tribe. It explains on its Web site (www.cric.org) that it isn't "a social club or a tribe, but a community of American Indian people who desire to build a better life for themselves and their children."
That alone should have spelled the end of any legal intervention by the community in Raven's case at the Maricopa County courthouse. Also, Raven Laws' natural parents have no known connection with any Indian tribe, recognized or not.
Indianz.Com. In Print.
http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/001677.asp
White boy most dangerous threat to Seneca Nation
Monday, March 5, 2007
A four-year-old boy with an Indian father and a white mother is at the center of an Indian child welfare dispute on the Seneca Nation in New York.
The tribe is matrilineal. Since Koby Hammer Parker's mother is white, he isn't eligible for tribal membership.
That didn't stop a tribal judge -- who is Koby's great-aunt -- from asserting jurisdiction in a custody battle between his parents. She cited the Indian Child Welfare Act, which applies to Indian children who are members, or eligible for membership, in a tribe.
The judge has since been removed from the case for a conflict of interest and Koby's status under ICWA is being considered by a Seneca appeals court. A Seneca man who is helping Koby's mother says the case threatens the Seneca's way of life.
"The most dangerous person on this reservation, right now, to our sovereignty, is that white boy," Michael D. Waterman told The Buffalo News.
Waterman got the parents to agree to joint custody pending the tribal appeals. He said the court system in Erie County should have never allowed Koby's case to be transferred to the tribe.
Get the Story:
Caught between two worlds (The Buffalo News 3/4)
http://www.whotv.com/global/story.asp?s=3558051&ClientType=Printable <http://www.whotv.com/global/story.asp?s=3558051&ClientType=Printable>
Meskwaki mother frustrated by laws that let tribe block adoption
IOWA CITY, Iowa A Meskwaki woman who wants her baby to be adopted says she is angry with tribal officials who have stepped in to block her wishes that her child be raised by non-native parents.22-year-old Kelly Buffalo is a member of the Tama-based Meskwaki tribe. She had arranged for her six-week-old son, Braven, to be adopted by a white couple in Indiana.
But shortly after giving birth, tribal officials intervened, temporarily taking custody and asserting the tribe's privilege under state law to protect the cultural heritage of the child and the tribe.
Today (Tuesday), a tribal judge reversed its decision and granted full legal custody to the mother, who says she will continue pursuing adoption for her son. But the first step involves receiving consent from the Meskwaki Tribal Council.
Buffalo says she has filed a petition seeking a meeting with the tribal council to make her case. A date for the meeting has not yet been set.
Copyright 2005 Associated Press.
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http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/nation/3258909
Tribe objects to adoption involving a white family
By TODD DVORAK
Associated Press July 11, 2005
IOWA CITY, IOWA - Kelly Buffalo, an American Indian from the Meskwaki tribe, believes her newborn will have a better future if he is adopted by a white Indiana couple.
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Shortly after Buffalo gave birth six weeks ago, tribal officials temporarily took custody of her son, asserting the tribe's privilege under state law to protect the cultural heritage of the child and the tribe.
On Tuesday, a tribal judge reversed the decision and granted full legal custody to the mother, who says she will continue pursuing adoption for her son, Braven.
But the first step involves receiving consent from the Meskwaki Tribal Council.
"This is really frustrating," said Buffalo, 22. "It's my baby and should be my decision. I'm probably more mad at what is happening than anything else."
Larry Lassley, executive director of the tribe, said the tribe has the authority under the Indian Child Welfare Act to intervene in adoption cases involving children of tribal members.
The Meskwaki tribe, which operates a lucrative casino in Tama, Iowa, is the only federally recognized tribe in the state.
Buffalo said she has filed a petition seeking a meeting with the tribal council to make her case. A date for the meeting has not been set.
Even though Buffalo is a tribal member, it's unlikely that the child will ever be formally enrolled in the tribe because his father is white.
HoustonChronicle.com --
July 3, 1997
Child welfare law a tug-of-war for state, tribes
By Tom Kizzia
Daily News reporter
The revival of formal tribal courts in Alaska began in 1980, when a few villages took up adoption cases under federal law. It proved an early introduction to the complexity of overlapping court jurisdictions, with neither the state nor the tribal courts willing to yield their authority.
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was intended to combat the widespread separation of Indian children from their parents and tribal communities. Alaska's tribes were recognized for the purposes of the act, giving Native villages here a start in forming their own courts.
But the unusual history of federal Indian policies for Alaska led to different interpretations of how the child welfare law should apply. As a result, the state and tribes are still at odds over the authority of tribal courts to handle adoptions and custody disputes.
Alaska has refused to acknowledge tribal adoptions unless tribes take special steps to apply for authority. A 1988 Alaska Supreme Court decision bound the state to that policy, which meshed with the state's refusal to recognize tribes in other matters.
''You have to recall that 10 or 15 years ago, most villages didn't have courts or a child-protection infrastructure,'' said assistant attorney general Becky Snow.
Tribes, on the other hand, refused to go along with the state's demand that they ''reapply'' to the federal government for child-welfare authority, which they contended they always had. They were backed by the federal 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which said Alaska tribes have automatic jurisdiction -- to be shared ''concurrently'' with the state -- in child welfare matters.
The state Department of Health and Social Services has fashioned compromise regulations that recognize ''cultural adoptions'' meeting certain tests. This still falls short of what some tribes seek, which is unqualified state recognition of a tribal court decree.
The clash forced a well-publicized showdown in 1993, when two planeloads of troopers flew to the western village of Toksook Bay to enforce a state court order to pick up a Native child. The village council had said the boy's grandmother should be given custody, and other Delta leaders denounced the troopers for ''gestapolike'' tactics.
Recent legal developments may have shifted authority in the tribes' favor.
In March, a state Superior Court judge ruled that a tribal court had jurisdiction in a Copper Center child custody fight, despite earlier state Supreme Court decisions to the contrary. Judge Eric Smith said the Bureau of Indian Affairs' 1993 recognition of Alaska tribes voided the state Supreme Court's reason for refusing in 1992 to recognize tribal courts in child-welfare matters. The state has appealed the ruling.
State lawyers concede that other changes -- including the growing capabilities of village courts and the Knowles administration's decision in 1993 to drop state opposition to federal recognition of tribes -- may ultimately require a new policy.
''I don't know what the state would argue now,'' said assistant attorney general Snow. ''I believe the state would be interested in resolving the situation in a rational way that would allow us to focus our resources on protecting children rather than fighting jurisdictional battles.''
If the state eventually accepts ''concurrent'' tribal jurisdiction, cooperative agreements would be necessary to make sure state and tribal social service work is coordinated.
''Tribes are willing to share power with states for accessing treatment for kids,'' said tribal courts consultant Kimberly Martus. ''It's not giving Native people very much credit to presume they will immediately opt for exclusive jurisdiction. People care more about their kids than to cut off the resources in the larger society.''
Recognition of Indian country also sets the stage for enlarging the field of tribal court jurisdiction into other areas of domestic relations -- marriage and divorce -- now handled by the state.
Such cases can become thorny, especially when two tribes have a dispute, warned Larry Long, deputy attorney general for the state of South Dakota. For example, where biological parents from two tribes divorce, each tribal court may sever the parental rights of the other parent, leaving children in a tug of war between sovereigns.
''These things are just nightmarish,'' Long said.
On the other hand, the tribal court of Minto faced just such a dispute and managed to bring children to their mother in Minto after troopers refused to get involved, said council chief Greg Alexander.
''We were lucky,'' Alexander said. ''We worked with the chief of the other village, and he kind of helped us out. We were able to work together, and that made it easier.''
Jewish relative keeps custody of Indian kids
Friday, July 26, 2002
By PAUL SHUKOVSKY
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
The state Supreme Court ruled yesterday that a Jewish grandmother will be allowed to continue raising her Native American grandchildren in her Tacoma home despite assertions from the mother that the children should be with her.
In a legal battle that balanced cultural protections for Indian families and tribes with the best interests of the children, the court ruled that transferring custody to the mother "would likely result in serious emotional and potentially physical damage to the children."
In 1992, Rebecca Johnston, an Alaskan Indian, and her boyfriend, Mark Mahaney, were living in Anchorage and both were struggling with the ravages of alcohol abuse, according to court documents. That March, they sent their two toddlers to live with their grandmother Erika Mahaney, also of Anchorage. The next year, they gave temporary legal custody to the grandmother, who moved with the youngsters to Tacoma.
The girl, now about 14, and the boy, about 12, have been living with their grandmother ever since and have been raised Jewish, attending Hebrew school and taking Yiddish lessons. The girl, according to court records, describes herself as being Jewish.
Over the years, Rebecca Johnston has made several attempts to regain custody of her children, asserting that she can give them a stable home environment.
An attempt to regain custody in 1994 failed when Erika Mahaney obtained, in Pierce County Superior Court, a temporary non-parental custody order.
Erika Mahaney told the court that the children suffered from "the effects of sexual abuse, domestic violence, general neglect and abandonment" while under their mother's care.
Johnston denied allegations that she used illegal drugs, and accusations from the girl that she sexually abused her. Johnston admits that she saw her younger brother sexually molest both children. In addition, she spent time behind bars after convictions for driving while intoxicated.
The children have been diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome, attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and other behavioral disorders associated with sexual abuse.
The court ordered that it was in the best interest of the children for the grandmother to retain custody.
Johnston brought her custody battle to the state Court of Appeals in 1999, asserting that under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, the Superior Court had not evaluated the evidence against her using the "clear and convincing standard" listed in federal Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines.
And she said that under the law, an expert versed in Indian culture should have been involved in evaluating the evidence against her.
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in 1978 "to promote the security and stability of Indian tribes" while protecting the best interests of Indian children. The law gives a clear preference for keeping Indian children with their families and placing Indian children who must be removed from their homes within their own families or Indian tribes.
The appellate court agreed with the mother and overturned the trial court ruling. The grandmother then brought the case to the Supreme Court.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court handed Mahaney a victory by overturning the court of appeals ruling.
Saying that the guidelines of evaluating the evidence by a clear and convincing standard do not have the effect of law, the court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not replace the mandate of Washington state law requiring that the best interests of the child be paramount.
"Even where there is no showing of present parental unfitness ... the court may take into consideration emotional and psychological damage from prior unfitness. Moreover, in the case before us, the court is entitled to examine the lack of a bond to the parent and the presence of a bond to the children's grandmother, who has been their parent figure for most of their lives."
The court also noted that under the Indian Child Welfare Act, placement with a grandmother, even a non-Indian, is contemplated as appropriate.
The justices quoted the trial lawyer who said that "transferring custody to (the mother) would likely result in serious emotional and potentially physical damage to the children."
The high court also held that there is no need for an expert witness to have special knowledge of Indian life if the testimony does not inject cultural bias or subjectivity into the proceedings.
© 1998-2002 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
August 17, 2006
Overcoming Adoption’s Racial Barriers
By LYNETTE CLEMETSON and RON NIXON
When Martina Brockway and Mike Timble, a white couple in Chicago, decided to adopt a child, Ms. Brockway went to an adoption agency presentation at a black church to make it clear they wanted an African-American baby.
Their biological daughter, Rumeur, 3, is accumulating black dolls in preparation for her new brother or sister. Black-themed children’s books like “Please, Baby, Please” by the filmmaker Spike Lee and his wife, Tonya Lewis Lee, share shelf space with Elmo and Dr. Seuss.
But the couple’s decision provoked some uneasy responses. One of Mr. Timble’s white friends asked, “Aren’t there any white kids available?”
Ms. Brockway’s black friends were supportive. “But,” she said, “I also sensed that there was maybe something they weren’t saying.”
Mr. Timble cut in. “Like maybe they were thinking, ‘What do these people think they are doing?’ ”
Ms. Brockway and Mr. Timble are among a growing number of white couples pushing past longtime cultural resistance to adopt black children. In 2004, 26 percent of black children adopted from foster care, about 4,200, were adopted transracially, nearly all by whites. That is up from roughly 14 percent, or 2,200, in 1998, according to a New York Times analysis of data from the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University and from the Department of Health and Human Services.
“It is a significant increase,” said Rita Simon, a sociologist at American University, who has written several books on transracial adoption. “It is getting easier, bureaucratically and socially. With so many people going overseas, people are also increasingly saying, Wait a minute, there are children here who need to be adopted, too.”
The 2000 census — the first in which information on adoptions was collected — showed that just over 16,000 white households included adopted black children. Adoption experts say there has been a notable increase since 2000.
The reasons for the increase are varied. The Multiethnic Placement Act and its amendments prohibited federally financed agencies from denying adoption based on race. The foster care system has sharply changed in recent years and now includes financial incentives for finding more adoptive families.
The combination of legal changes and greater embracing of multicultural families — Americans have adopted more than 200,000 children from overseas in the past 15 years — have lessened resistance from both blacks and whites. The long wait for white children and the high costs of international adoptions — typically $15,000 to $35,000 — also play a role.
And agencies are offering courses to help adoptive parents enter the process with more cultural openness and awareness.
Ms. Brockway and Mr. Timble decided to adopt after a physically and emotionally wrenching first pregnancy — their daughter was delivered at 25 weeks. They did not want to deal with the long wait for a white infant, and adopting from overseas did not appeal to them.
“Some people see Asian or other ethnicities as closer to white, more acceptable, easier,” said Ms. Brockway, a teacher. “That’s just not us. We feel like we have the open arms and minds to be a good match to an African-American child.”
In practice, however, decisions about adoption placements are still influenced by racial considerations, many families say. Since 1994, white prospective parents have filed, and largely won, more than two dozen discrimination lawsuits, according to state and federal court records. Many more disputes have been settled in arbitration.
The loaded jumble of viewpoints and anxieties related to transracial adoptions of black children are complex and often contradictory.
Rhetoric around the issue has softened considerably since the National Association of Black Social Workers, in 1972, likened whites adopting black children to “cultural genocide.” The group removed the genocide reference from its policy statement in 1994, but it still recommends same-race placements. And organizations like the Child Welfare League have argued in recent years that while race need not be the primary consideration in placements, it should not be disregarded.
Many blacks still worry that white families cannot equip black children to navigate the country’s complicated racial landscape.
“Adoption, like everything else in this country, gets filtered through the lens of race,” said Joseph Crumbley, a black social worker in Philadelphia and a consultant on transracial adoptions. “For blacks, it is about how comfortable can whites be in dealing with the issue of race when their race is in conflict with the race of the child.”
At the same time, some blacks view international adoptions by whites as a slight to black children in need of permanent and stable homes. “I can’t help but wonder why Angelina and Brad can’t adopt an African-American baby here with so many in need,” said Ishia Granger, 36, a black friend of Ms. Brockway.
More than 45,000 black children were waiting to be adopted from foster care in 2004. There are no reliable national figures for private adoptions.
Advocates of black adoption criticize adoption agencies as not doing enough to recruit black families. But one strategy agencies use, in part, to recruit black families — reducing fees for African-American adoptions — seems to some critics like a literal devaluing of black children. And while current adoption laws impose penalties on federally financed agencies that discriminate, there are no penalties for failure to identify black adoptive families.
Both black and white families, at times, feel discriminated against. Charlene White, a black adoptive mother in Richmond, Va., said that when she and her husband, Malachi, began the process in 1997, a counselor asked them about drug and criminal records — questions a white couple they knew who were also adopting were not asked.
“It was definitely because we were black,” Ms. White said.
A white judge initially denied Nick and Emily Mebruer’s petition to adopt a black child, ruling that the Mebruers, a white couple who live in rural Lebanon, Mo., were “uniquely unqualified” to parent a black child because of their limited interaction with black people and culture. The ruling was overturned, and their daughter, Maggie, is now 3.
“We felt like it was an indictment of us and our entire community,” said Mrs. Mebruer, a family doctor, as Maggie played with a black doll in the center of the living room and danced to the Australian children’s group the Wiggles. “It was assuming that we didn’t have the desire or the capacity to learn.”
The Mebruers did not explicitly set out to adopt a black child. But when the Kansas City office of Catholic Charities called one spring afternoon to say that an infant was available and that they needed the couple’s decision within hours, the race of the child, Mr. Mebruer said, was secondary.
White families adopting black children are increasingly learning that the “love is enough” approach to adoption that families bring to the process is often met with skepticism.
Psychologists, researchers and adoptees themselves say many children adopted transracially in past decades suffered from philosophies focused on assimilation, with little or no acknowledgment of racial and cultural conflict.
Robert O’Connor, 39, who was raised by a white family in Rush City, Minn., recalled his struggles growing up in a small town with few other blacks. Throughout his youth, he said, he felt awkward around other blacks. He did not understand black trends in fashion or music or little things like playing the dozens, the oral tradition of dueling insults.
“I always felt like I had this ‘A’ on my forehead, this adoptee, that people could see from a far distance that I was different,” said Mr. O’Connor, who now researches transracial adoptions as assistant professor of social work at Metropolitan State University in St. Paul.
Today, some agencies are working to avoid mistakes of the past. Ms. Brockway and Mr. Timble are adopting through the Cradle, a Chicago agency that gives transracial adoptive parents extensive counseling as well as a course on “conspicuous families.”
One exercise meant to assess parents’ comfort level in confronting racial issues lists a roster of stereotypes including, “lazy,” “passive” and “athletic,” and asks parents to assign them to the race or ethnic group to which they are often applied.
Judy Stigger, a counselor at the Cradle and herself a white adoptive mother of two black children, now adults, makes the issues tangible to prospective parents by relating personal stories. She tells about the time when her son, then a teenager, reached into her purse at a McDonald’s and a clerk called security; and the time when her daughter began crying while looking through congratulatory cards sent by family and friends when they took her home.
“Was I supposed to have been white?” her daughter, then in the third grade, asked. Ms. Stigger had never noticed that the children on all of the cards were white.
“It’s about getting people to realize that they should not be thinking about being, as one 8-year-old put it to me, ‘a white family with a weird child,’ but a multiracial family,” Ms. Stigger said. “The way most white people use the term ‘colorblind’ is just silly. We want to create color aware families, not colorblind families.”
Ms. Brockway worked for years in predominantly black schools and now tutors children in foster care. Mr. Timble, who owns a promotional printing business, has a cousin who has adopted four black children. They live in an ethnically diverse section of northwest Chicago.
But after working through the adoption process, Ms. Brockway said, they are considering moving to a neighborhood with more black professionals and finding a more diverse church.
For some adopting families, public reaction defies assumptions. Katherine and Ryan Liebl were dining recently in the Oak Park neighborhood of Chicago, where they live, when a black family asked them where they had adopted their son, Matthew, now 8 months old.
They responded that he was from Chicago and steeled for disapproval. Instead, they said, the family cheered: “Yeah, domestic baby. Good for you!”
The Liebls, who adopted through the Cradle, were chosen by black birth parents from profiles submitted by black and white adoptive families. The same birth parents had previously chosen a black couple, Dana and Drayden Hilliard, to adopt two older children. So the Liebls’ son Matthew has two biological siblings being raised by a black family in a nearby suburb.
The two families have become friends and are raising the children as siblings, getting them together about once a month.
The Hilliards said they were surprised that the birth mother chose a white family. “But wherever a child can find love, black, white or purple, that is all right with me,” said Ms. Hilliard, 39, a program analyst. “I do feel that if parents adopt transracially they owe it to their child to keep them connected with their heritage. But we are happy to be a resource for that.”
The two families do not know for sure what attracted the birth mother to them, but they said worldliness seemed to have trumped race. The birth mother commented to each that their expressed love for travel would offer her children a chance to explore the world that she never had.
“We feel like we struck gold,” said Mr. Liebl, 31, a lawyer. “Matthew has these siblings that he will know and this level of contact between us that is authentic and not forced.”
In the personal letters that the Cradle requires adoptive parents to submit to birth parents, those adopting transracially are asked to include examples of how they would bring diversity to a child’s life.
Ms. Brockway said it had been a difficult exercise. She wants to include pictures with black friends, but not too many. She wants to write about her black students, Mike’s black relatives and co-workers, their activities in black communities — but not too much.
“I don’t want to appear over the top, trying too hard, like we think we’re cool because we have black friends.” she said. “And who is to say what any birth mother will think is important or how any one views or defines diversity and culture. These things are different for everyone.”
Sabrina I. Pacifici contributed additional reporting.
TRENDS AND PITFALLS IN ADOPTION
By Toby Solomon, Esq.
Introduction
The increasing interest in adoption resulting from a variety of situations including delayed marriage, an apparent increase in infertility, and a recognition of the needs of large numbers of orphaned, abandoned, and abused children for new homes, has led to increasing legislative and judicial attention being paid to both the termination of parental rights and adoption process.
In New Jersey a variety of new concepts were brought to the adoption process through a revision of the adoption laws.1 The new law, which was passed in December, 1993, addressed and resolved many of the traditional problems that birth parents, adoptive parents, and children had with the process, but recent developments have brought into focus new issues which need to be addressed, and the lack of a uniform national approach to adoption has also led to, often unexpected, difficulties. This article will look at some of these pitfalls and some of the solutions that have been developed and implemented around the nation to address them.
The Problem of the Missing Father -The Putative Father Registry
The enactment of the New Jersey Adoption Amendments with the increased safeguards for all parties to the adoption triad, does not prevent a "Baby Jessica" tragedy from happening in New Jersey.2
One approach to preventing this is a putative father registry. Many states have enacted putative father registries which give putative fathers the opportunity to make their interest in a child known and enables them to receive notice of an adoption, so that they can object to the adoption if they wish to establish a relationship with their child. Conversely, the registry protects adoptive parents and birth mothers from having an adoption disrupted as one who does not register may be barred from receiving notice or objecting. Fur purposes of this discussion, a "putative father" is a man who believes he may be the biological father of a child, but who is neither married to the mother, nor has legally established his paternity of the child.
Different time periods for registration are allowed in different states. A putative father registry could work as follows: in order for a putative father to receive notice of an adoption, he would be obligated to register with the registry or file a Certificate of Parentage either during the pregnancy or up to thirty days following the birth of the child. If a petition for adoption was not filed within thirty days of the birth, a longer period of time to register might be provided. If the putative father registered in a timely manner, he would receive notice of the adoption and an opportunity to contest the adoption. If paternity is established, the putative father may acquire the right to seek custody of the child or to develop and retain a relationship with the child. In some states he acquires an absolute veto over the adoption.3 However, if he does not register within the allotted time (or in some states prior to the filing of a petition for adoption) he looses the right to object to the adoption and is deemed to have abandoned the child.
Although not perfect, the registry is a solution to a variety of problems. For example, it gives the birth father an opportunity to protect his rights without having to rely upon the adoptive parents or the birth mother for information. It further assures the birth mother and the adoptive parents that the adoption will not be disrupted because of an unknown father or a father whose whereabouts are unknown who later appears on the scene. It places the responsibility with the putative father for protecting his rights, rather than other parties. It also protects the rights of a putative father more than publication, or depending on the birth mother to volunteer his identity or whereabouts.
In Oregon, for example, the registry system places the affirmative duty on a putative father to protect his interests in a child. A recent amendment states that if a putative father does not file the notice of the commencement of filiation proceedings with the Oregon State Department of Human Resources prior to the placement of a child in the physical custody of the prospective adoptive parents, he is barred from contesting the adoption.4
Tennessee recently amended its adoption laws including its putative father registry to require registration prior to or within thirty days after the birth of a child.5 The Statute further requires the birth father to file a change of address within ten days of any such change. The person who is registered has thirty days from receipt of the notice of a pending adoption or termination proceeding to file a petition to legitimate or to intervene for the purposes of establishing a claim to paternity. The failure to intervene within thirty days of such notice is grounds for termination of parental rights.
Likewise, in Illinois, the Baby Richard6 case has led to the enactment of a putative father registry as well as best interests legislation and additional notice requirements. In Indiana the legislature recently clarified the pre-birth notice requirement and putative father registry.7
In New Jersey, a Bill is presently pending which would revise the Adoption Statute and amend N.J.S.A. 9:3-45.8 The presumed birth father of the child who has not acknowledged paternity by executing a Certificate of Parentage within six months of a child's birth, or has not filed an action for paternity would not be served notice of the adoption. The Amendment would also change the legal standard used in contested adoptions. Under the proposed Amendment, the court would use the best interests standard. Currently in New Jersey, a birth parent must be found unfit or must have abandoned the child before the best interests standard can be considered.
The Problem of Whose Law to Apply
A perplexing issue remains as to which state's law should determine a birth father's rights in a multi-state situation. Even the proposed Uniform Adoption Act (Act) does not address this dilemma9. Of course, should the Act be adopted by each state (which is highly unlikely), this will largely moot the issue. Where the insemination, domicile of birth father and birth mother, place of birth of the child, domicile of the adoptive parents, location of placing agency may be in different states, which state's law should govern the birth father's rights, potentially creating rights or duties for him in excess of those imposed or granted by his own jurisdiction's law?
In some jurisdictions the birth father must either register or live with the birth mother in order to have any rights, and more and more states are adopting putative father registries and enacting legislation pertaining to the rights of the unwed birth fathers in an adoption.
In Arizona, for example, a biological mother is now required to execute an affidavit naming all potential biological fathers. Each of these fathers must be served by legal process with a notice containing specified information including the birth mother's pregnancy and her intent to pursue an adoption. Once the biological father receives this notice he is required to institute a paternity action within thirty days. If he does not, he looses his standing as a parent and his consent to the adoption is no longer necessary.10 In addition, to adjust to a potential problem of a birth mother failing to identify the correct birth father, Arizona established a putative father registry.11
Many states have added provisions that the putative father's consent to adoption/termination of parental rights could be implied where he has not legally established paternity and has not registered as a putative father with the appropriate state agency.12 Various jurisdictions have had widely disparate holdings about the rights of birth fathers. For example, in Arizona, the Supreme Court concluded that a birth father must take concrete steps to establish the legal or emotional bonds of a parent-child relationship, before he may attain constitutional protection.13 In another case, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that where the birth father did not take any action before the child was three and a half years old, and had reasonable grounds to know he might have fathered a child, he should have protected his parental rights by investigating the possibility and acting appropriately on this information.14
In a Colorado case, the Court determined that although Colorado law prohibited a birth parent from challenging an adoption more than two years after it has been entered, the law did not apply in a case where the birth father's rights had been terminated through fraud.15
Wrongful Adoption - The Other Side of the Law
Recently, Sixty Minutes presented a segment about two birth fathers who filed claims against a California lawyer and the birth mothers who placed the children for adoption out of state.16 The birth mothers in these cases traveled to California from other states and each placed her child with Canadian couples.
In one of these cases, a multi-million dollar verdict was entered in favor of a birth father against a birth mother and others, including California counsel, for wrongful deprivation of parental rights.17
According to the California lawyer, the facts were as follows: the birth mother, a thirty year old unmarried kindergarten teacher, residing in Huntington, West Virginia became pregnant in October, 1990 by a recent medical school graduate she had gone out with periodically for some years. They had never lived together, nor had he contributed to her support. In fact, the alleged birth father urged her to have an abortion.
Embarrassed and humiliated, the birth mother left West Virginia and visited friends and relatives in other states while she considered her options. While visiting her aunt, who was a nun in Minnesota, she decided on adoption. The birth mother and her mother went to Los Angeles and sought out the services of the attorney. The birth father opposed the adoption. The birth mother, however, determined that adoption was the best plan for her child.
The birth mother selected a young lawyer and his wife who lived in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. At the time, Alberta statutes did not provide for notice of guardianship or adoption proceedings to unwed fathers unless they had lived with the mother for one year before birth. The adopting couple went to Los Angeles, met the birth mother and her parents and received the child from the hospital pursuant to a State Department of Social Services health facility discharge form identifying the adopting parents as prescribed by California law. The adoptive couple filed for adoption in Canada.
The birth father subsequently filed a petition in Cabell County, West Virginia Circuit Court requesting a paternity test and declaration of paternity. The birth father requested and obtained an Ex Parte Injunction from the County Court enjoining the birth mother from placing the child.
The birth father located the adoptive parents in January, 1992 and hired Alberta counsel to oppose the still pending adoption. The petition was denied and the adoption was granted.
In July, 1992 he filed an action for damages in the County Circuit Court in West Virginia alleging a conspiracy to deprive him of his parental rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of civil rights and outrage.
There are troubling jurisdictional questions. West Virginia asserted jurisdiction over a California lawyer, all of whose activities in the case took place in California, whose birth mother client was living in California, where the child was born, and ultimately placed for adoption.18 The lawyer was listed in the West Virginia Yellow Pages. This listing, however, did not produce this case.
Under California Adoption Law, at the time the placement occurred, the mother of a child born out of wedlock had exclusive control over the custody of the child, including the power and right to place the child for adoption, to the exclusion of any rights of the child's father solely by reason of his paternity.19 Under the California Civil Code an unwed father must receive the child into his family, either before birth by cohabitating with the mother, or after birth by the child physically entering his home, before he could achieve presumed father status with custodial rights.20,21 Accordingly, California courts must look at a father's efforts to act like a parent both pre-birth and post-birth. If those efforts are insufficient to elevate his rights to those of the mother, his rights will be determined at a best interests hearing and will most likely be terminated.
The West Virginia court instructed the jury that the UCCJA applied and that West Virginia was the "home state" and the exclusive forum where the child's custody could be litigated.22,23 It further instructed the jury that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) applied, and the attorney and the birth mother had violated the ICPC by failing to make an application for placement through the West Virginia Compact Office, not withstanding the fact that she was not there when the baby was born and West Virginia was therefore neither the sending state, nor the receiving state.24 Further, Alberta was not a signatory to the ICPC.
In another case, an Ohio couple's wrongful adoption claims were barred in part by the applicable statute of limitations.25 The Supreme Court of Ohio was the first state supreme court to recognize the tort of wrongful adoption.26 In that case plaintiffs, the adoptive parents of a minor child, claimed that the defendant, the Tuscarawas County Department of Human Services (DHS), was negligent in providing medical care for the child, causing him to have a more advanced state of cancer than at the time he was originally diagnosed. They further alleged that because of the cancer's advanced state the child suffered from depression and oppositional personality disorder, which were foreseeable results of cancer of the central nervous system. The adoptive parents averred that prior to the placement, employees of DHS recklessly stated the child was in perfect health.
Plaintiffs sought damages to compensate the child for present and future pain and suffering and to compensate them for present and future medical and special educational expenses that they incurred. The defendants moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted and the appeals court reversed in part.
In a recent Connecticut case, the court determined that employees of an out of state adoption agency which conducted workshops within the state for the purpose of inducing Connecticut residents to enter into a contract with the agency for locating and placing a child with the couple, were individually liable as they had sufficient contact with the state to permit jurisdiction over them in a suit for breach of contract.27 This included employees who did not take part in the seminars. The court held they had sufficient contacts with the state to permit jurisdiction over them.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court extended the tort of negligent misrepresentation to the adoption context and further held that the extension of tort to adoptions did not violate public policy.28 In this case the adoptive parents brought an action against the employees of an agency alleging wrongful adoption. Although indicating that the biological mother suffered from learning disabilities due to head trauma, it did not disclose the fact that the child's biological mother and grandmother were intellectually limited and that the child the couple adopted was mentally retarded and severely disturbed. The Court ruled that where an adoption agency does make representations, it has a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner and where the agency breaches that duty, a claim for negligent misrepresentation may be brought.
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court directly addressed the issue of wrongful adoption.29 The adoptive couple alleged that the Department of Public Welfare misrepresented and fraudulently concealed the medical and family history of a child, who they placed and was subsequently adopted by them. The adoptive couple was not told by the social worker responsible for the child's adoption that the birth mother was a committed patient at Worcester State Hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and that the child herself had been diagnosed with developmental problems.
The jury awarded the adoptive parents 3.8 million dollars in compensatory damages. This award was later reduced to $200,000. The Court allowed liability for wrongful adoption for claims based both on intentional and negligent misrepresentation to the adoptive parents. The court ruled that an agency has an affirmative duty to disclose to adoptive parents information about a child that will enable them to make a knowledgeable decision about whether to accept the child for adoption.
In Pennsylvania a wrongful adoption matter was brought by adoptive parents who sued a state agency and a private child placement agency for fraudulently and negligently failing to reveal the history of physical and sexual abuse which had been inflicted upon the child placed for adoption.30 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the traditional common-law causes of action grounded in fraud and negligence applied to the adoption setting. The Court held that adoption agencies have a duty to disclose fully and accurately all relevant non-identifying information. The Court, however, did not impose an affirmative duty to investigate the adoptee's mental and/or physical health.
In another Pennsylvania action, the adoptive parents filed an action in fraud and negligence against the county adoption agency alleging that it failed to reveal the mental illness and alleged drug and alcohol abuse of the biological parents of the adoptee. 31 However, in this case the court held that the action was barred pursuant to the Pennsylvania code which excludes liability for conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct in the case of a local government agency.
This year Virginia added a provision to its code, which makes it a felony for any person knowingly and intentionally provide false information, material to an adoptive placement, under oath and in writing. The code calls for punishment by imprisonment of not less than one year, nor more than five years, and at the discretion of the jury, confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine up of $1,000, either or both.32 The statute includes penalties for all parties, including clients, attorneys, adopting parents, birth parents and employees of agencies.
Legal Malpractice
New Jersey recently addressed legal malpractice in the context of adoption.33 The novel issue in this matter was whether damages for emotional distress were recoverable where an attorney was retained to pursue non-economic claims. The court answered the question in the affirmative and denied the defendant-attorney's motion for summary judgement.
The defendant-attorney's alleged malpractice arose from having served the adoption complaint on the birth parents, thereby erroneously disclosing to them privileged information, including the name and address of the adoptive parents and the adoptee.34 Plaintiffs claimed that the breach of confidentiality caused them to suffer severe emotional distress. The attorney argued in a motion for summary judgment that case law precluded recovery for emotional distress under these circumstances as a matter of law.35 Plaintiffs argued that the Gautam case, which articulated this standard, was not controlling because their claim was not predicated upon an economic loss. Instead they contended that the improper disclosure of privileged information severely damaged their emotional and mental well being and that these circumstances be deemed "extraordinary" as contemplated by Gautam.36
The court reasoned that since no economic claim was impaired by counsel's alleged negligence that the "suit within a suit" framework typically utilized in adjudicating legal malpractice actions had no application in the matter. The court further reasoned that consequently without the ability to seek redress for emotional distress damages, negligent counsel have "virtual immunity" for any malpractice committed when retained for non-economic purposes.37 The court held that such a result would be contrary to the public interest and accordingly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment.38
Indian Child Welfare Act
Another pitfall for the uninformed, is the implication of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Two basic elements are required for the application of the ICWA: the child must be an Indian child as defined by the ICWA,39 and the proceeding must be a child custody proceeding as defined by the ICWA.40 All adoptions, including stepparent adoptions are included under the ICWA.41 The tribe in which the child is a member or eligible for membership must be a Federally recognized Indian tribe. A list of Federally recognized Indian tribes is published annually in the Federal Register. Although no ICWA cases specifically address what it means to be "eligible" for membership, the safer course of conduct is to treat a child as an Indian child once any suggestion of Indian heritage has been raised, until a negative determination on the Indian status has been obtained.
An attorney must advise clients when they are considering adopting a child that the ICWA must be followed scrupulously in order to avoid future problems. Any adoption involving an Indian child is a high risk adoption, which means that there is an increased chance that the adoptive placement might be disrupted.
In a recent California case, the trial court ordered two year old twin girls who lived in Ohio all their lives returned to their paternal grandmother (with whom they never lived) because they were found to be Indian children. The California Court of Appeals stayed the transfer twenty minutes before the twins were to be transferred. The Court held that:
We find ourselves entirely in agreement with the comments of counsel for amicus American Academy of Adoption Attorneys who expressed the view that 'a custody hearing is required to determine the placement of a child whenever an adoption is dismissed or denied, whatever the applicable law. When a child's interests and needs are affected detrimentally by a proposed remedy for a wrong inflicted upon a parent or de facto parent, the law must craft a solution that protects the child. ...'42
More than a dozen Amici are participating in the case, and to date the tribe and its supporters have petitioned this California Supreme Court for review, but the Supreme Court has not ruled on the petition. The California Court agreed with Appellate Courts in other states which have concluded that the ICWA does not apply to the voluntary adoptive placement of a child of Indian lineage unless the child is part of an existing Indian family in which one or both parents have a significant social, cultural political relationship with a tribe. However, other courts have justified the existing Indian Family Doctrine as consistent with the ICWA's policy of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes. The minimal Federal standards are intended to prevent the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families and troubled communities.
In a Montana case where the child was one-eighth Chippewa Indian, the parental rights of the biological parents were terminated. The child's biological uncle and the child's foster parents then sought to adopt the child. The tribe later sought to intervene in the proceedings. The trial court held that the child was not an Indian under the ICWA, but the Montana Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to the ICWA and held that the tribe did not waive its right to intervene at any point in the proceedings.43
In Idaho, however, its Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision that an Indian child would suffer serious emotional harm if removed from his prospective adoptive parents. Therefore, the Court ruled that good cause existed to deviate from the placement preferences of the ICWA.44
In the Matter of Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that although the mother had voluntarily relinquished her child to an adoptive couple and the child had never lived in an Indian environment or with an Indian family, this did not preclude the application of the ICWA.45
In a recent New Jersey case the Appellate Division ruled that an adopted person of Indian heritage may obtain information contained in a sealed adoption record, including the identity of the natural parents, if it establishes or helps establish tribal membership so that the adoptee could avail herself of benefits under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act.46
Same-Sex Adoption
The New Jersey Appellate Division recently concluded that the New Jersey Adoption Laws permit the adoption of children by the same-sex cohabitating partner of their natural mother, without affecting the mother's parental rights. 47
The Appellate Court was persuaded that because the adoption sought clearly served the best interests of the children, the judgment of adoption should be granted. New Jersey courts have always focused on the best interests of the child. This is another emerging trend throughout the nation.
Other states have recently considered the precise question in similar factual contexts. The Vermont Supreme Court noted that the precise circumstances of such adoptions may not have been contemplated during the initial drafting of the statute, but that the general intent and spirit of its statute in Section 448 (which is analogous to N.J.S.A. 9:3-50) is entirely consistent with them.48
In New York, the state's highest court recognized the right of an unmarried partner of a child's biological mother, whether heterosexual or homosexual, who was raising the child together with the biological parent, to become the child's second parent by means of adoption.49 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that two unmarried women could jointly adopt the child who was the biological daughter of one of the women and the biological cousin of the other.50 The District of Columbia (DC) Court of Appeals recently ruled that two unmarried persons may jointly petition to adopt.51 The court applied a liberal construction to the adoption statute and concluded that adoption by an unmarried couple can be in a child's best interests.
Conclusion
Since non-nuclear families are a growing percentage of today's households, our courts must acknowledge and appreciate the evolution of non-traditional families in our society. The courts appear to be acknowledging that in order to have rights, each parent must undertake the correlative duties associated with it. Accordingly, in recent decisions allowing children to achieve a measure of permanency by a legally recognized relationship with both parents who are same-sex partners, and by placing greater responsibilities on unwed birth fathers, the courts appear to be using the best interests standard to promote the welfare of children. Similarly, by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful adoption courts are sending a message to those who would be less than responsible when dealing with children's lives.
Reprinted with permission from the New Jersey Family Lawyer,
a publication of the New Jersey State Bar Association
1 See James B. Boskey and Toby Solomon, "Reconsidering Adoption, The New Jersey Adoption Statute," New Jersey Family Lawyer (Vol. XIV, No. 3, 1994)
2 In re Clausen, 442 Mich. 648, 502 N.W.2d 649 (1993) (Baby Jessica) In the Baby Jessica case the mother of the child intentionally identified the wrong man as the father. The adoptive parents believing they had the consent of the father, assumed custody of the child only to learn that the birth father objected to the adoption.
3 See infra for examples of states requiring pre-birth and post-birth participation of a birth father in order for his rights to be established.
4 O.R.S. 109.096
5 Public Chapter No. 532 of the Public Acts of Tennessee of 1995
6 In Re Kirschner, 164 Ill.2d 649, N.E. 2d 324 (1995) (Baby Richard) (holding that the birth father's rights be reinstated on grounds that he had been defrauded when told by the birth mother that the child had died and that the child be returned to the birth father despite living in stable adoptive home for approximately four years.)
7 Indiana Code §31-3-1-6.4
8 A-1534 is sponsored by Assemblymen Kavanaugh and Bateman.
9 A Uniform Adoption Act (1994) has been approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Act aims to be a comprehensive and uniform state adoption code.
10 A.R.S. §8-106
11 A.R.S. §8-106.01
12 See, for example, Idaho Code §16-1504 and §16-1513
13 In the Matter of the Appeal in Pima Juvenile, Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 876 P.2d 1121 (1994)
14 In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 876 P.2d 1137 (1994)
15 In Re Adoption of: P.H.A., 899 P.2d 345 (Col. App. 1995)
16 April 28, 1996
17 Circuit Court of Cabell County, WV Action 91-C-871.
18 See State of Florida Department of Rehabilitative Services v. Friends of Children, Inc., 653 F.Supp. 1221 (N.D. Fla. 1986)
19 See Darwin v. Ganger, 174 Cal.2d 63, 344 P.2d 353 (Cal. App. 1959)
20 See Adoption of Rebecca B., 68 Cal.App.3d 193 (1977)
21 In 1992 the California Supreme Court held that the termination of a father's rights in a "best interests" hearing was unconstitutional if it were applied to a thwarted father, one who made efforts to act like a parent. Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal.4th 816 (1992). However, after a trial court interpreted the Kelsey ruling to allow it to balance the pre-birth efforts with the diligent post-birth efforts of the birth father, the California Supreme Court reversed and held that the father's rights were not constitutionally protected due to his inaction during the mother's pregnancy. In the Matter of Michael H. 10 Cal.4th 1043 (1995)
22 A fair interpretation of the UCCJA is that it does not come into play in a custody dispute standing alone, but rather its application depends on the existence of separate proceedings affecting the same child in different jurisdictions. In any case the facts as stated are inconsistent with any of the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA.
23 The Uniform Adoption Act clarifies the relationship of the UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to adoption proceedings.
24 All states are signatories to the ICPC. See N.J.S.A. 9:23-5
25 Henning v. Tuscarawas County Dept. of Human Services, 1996 WL 73877 (Ohio App. 5 Dist., January 8, 1996)
26 Burr v. County Comm'rs of Stark County, 23 Ohio St. 69, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (1986)
27 Basta v. Today's Adoption, 1995 WL 447894 (Con. Super. July 24, 1995) (unpublished)
28 Mallette V. Children's Friend and Service, 661 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1995)
29 Mohr v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 421 Mass. 147, 653 N.E.2d 1104 (1995)
30 Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 647 A.2d 882 (1994)
31 Zernhelt v. Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services, 659 A.2d 89 (Pa. Commwlth 1995)
32 §63.1-220.6
33 Kohn v. Schiappa, 281 N.J. Super 235 (L.Div. 1995)
34 Id. at 237
35 Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, certif. denied, 109 N.J. 39 (App.Div. 1987)
36 Id. at 238
37 Id. at 238-239
38 Id. at 241-242
39 25 USC §1903 (4)
40 25 USC §1903 (1)
41 In Re Crystal K., 226 Cal.App.3d 655 (1990)
42 In re Bridget R., 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 (1996)
43 In the Matter of the Adoption of Jessica Lynn Riffle, 273 Mont. 237, 902 P2d 542 (Mont. 1995)
44 In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 902 P2d 477 (Idaho 1995)(Doe II)
45 In the Matter of Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155 (1988)
46 Matter of Adoption of Mellinger, 288 N.J. Super 191 (App.Div. 1996)
47 Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1995); See Toby Solomon, "Adoption by Same-Sex Partners," New Jersey Lawyer Magazine No. 175, March 1996
48 Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 628 A.2d 1271 (Sup. Ct. Vt. 1993)
49 In the Matter of Dana; In the Matter of Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397 (1995)
50 Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993)
51 In Re M.M.D. and B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. App. 1995)
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